Abstract. A black-box combiner for collision resistant hash functions (CRHF) is a construction which given black-box access to two hash functions is collision resistant if at least one of the components is collision resistant. In this paper we prove a lower bound on the output length of black-box combiners for CRHFs. The bound we prove is basically tight as it is achieved by a recent construction of Canetti et al [Crypto'07]. The best previously known lower bounds only ruled out a very restricted class of combiners having a very strong security reduction: the reduction was required to output collisions for both underlying candidate hash-functions given a single collision for the combiner (Canetti et al [Crypto'07] building on Boneh and Boyen [Crypto'06] and Pietrzak [Eurocrypt'07]). Our proof uses a lemma similar to the elegant "reconstruction lemma" of Gennaro and Trevisan [FOCS'00], which states that any function which is not one-way is compressible (and thus uniformly random function must be one-way). In a similar vein we show that a function which is not collision resistant is compressible. We also borrow ideas from recent work by Haitner et al. [FOCS'07], who show that one can prove the reconstruction lemma even relative to some very powerful oracles (in our case this will be an exponential time collision-finding oracle).
Introduction
Combiners. A robust black-box (1, 2)-combiner for some cryptographic primitive α is a construction, which given black-box access to two components, securely implements α if either of the two components securely implements α. More generally, for k ≤ , one can consider black-box (k, )-combiners which securely implement α, if at least k of the components the combiner has access to securely implement α. In this introduction, we will mostly talk about (1, 2)-combiners (and simply call them combiners), but the results in the paper are stated for general (k, )-combiners.
Combiners for CRHFs. Combiners can be used as a hedge against the failure of a concrete construction: the combiner remains secure as long as at least one of the two combined constructions is not broken. In light of the many recent attacks on popular collision resistant hash functions [20, 21] , combiners for CRHFs are of particular practical interest. A function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v is collision-resistant, if no efficient algorithm can find two inputs M = M where H(M ) = H(M ), such a pair (M, M ) is called a collision for H.
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One trivially gets a (1, 2)-combiner for CRHF by simply concatenating the outputs of the components: C H1,H2 (X) = H 1 (X) H 2 (X).
This is a robust combiner for any reasonable definition of "robust", as a collision for C H1,H2 (.) is also a collision for H 1 (.) and H 2 (.). Unfortunately the output length C out of C H1,H2 is twice the output length H out of its components, which makes this combiner not very useful for practical applications, where the output length is usually a crucial parameter, and doubling it is not an option. The existence of black-box combiners for CRHFs with "short" output length has first been investigated by Boneh and Boyen [2] who showed that no "highly efficient" robust combiner with output length C out < 2 H out exists. Here "highly efficient" means that the combiner is allowed only one query to each of its components (thus the combiner (1) who achieves C out = 2 H out is the best "highly efficient" black-box combiner one can hope for). Subsequently, for the more general case where one allows the combiner C any number q C of oracle gates, a lower bound of C out ≥ 2 H out − O(log q C ) was proven [16] . In [2, 16] a combiner is defined as a pair (C, P ), where the oracle circuit C defines the construction of the combiner, and the oracle PPTM P is the "security proof" for C. The security definition requires that for any hash functions H 1 , H 2 , and any collision M, M (i.e. M = M and C H1,H2 (M ) = C H1,H2 (M )), we have that P H1,H2 (M, M ) finds a collision for H 1 and H 2 (here we say that a collision for H i is found if P makes two queries X = X to H i where H i (X) = H i (X )). This is a good definition, as such a (C, P ) clearly achieves what one intuitively would require from a robust combiner. But when proving impossibility results, one should try to use a definition which is as general as possible, and ideally should cover (and thus rule out) any black-box construction which would satisfy what one intuitively would consider a robust combiner. In this paper we consider what is arguably the most general definition of black-box combiners for CRHFs.
A General Definition. Informally, we define a randomized black-box combiner for CRHFs as a pair (C, P ), where C is a randomized oracle circuit, and the oracle PPTM P is the security reduction. For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we say that an oracle B ρ-breaks C H1,H2 , if on input some randomness R the oracle B outputs a collision for C H1,H2 (R, .) for at least a ρ fraction of the R's. The combiner (C, P ) is ρ-robust if for any H 1 , H 2 and any B which ρ-breaks C H1,H2 the PPTM P in the random experiment P B,H1,H2 (let us stress that P can query its oracles B, H 1 , H 2 adaptively) finds a collision for H 1 and a collision for H 2 with high probability.
Thus if (C, P ) is ρ-robust, by picking the randomness for C H1,H2 uniformly at random, with probability at least 1 − ρ we will get a construction which is secure if either H 1 or H 2 is. A combiner (C, P ) is efficient, if C and P make a polynomial number of oracle queries, and robust if it is ρ-robust with ρ ∈ o(1).
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Remark 1 (on the definition). In practice it's not enough to require that C and P make a polynomial number of queries, one would require that their total running time is polynomial. One would also require ρ-security where ρ is negligible, not only ρ ∈ o(1). But keep in mind that we want to prove an impossibility result, so using such an "undemanding" definition makes the impossibility result actually stronger.
Combining CRHF Families. In our definition, the (randomized) combiner is instantiated with two hash-functions H 1 , H 2 . A seemingly more general definition would allow an instantiation of the combiner with two families H 1 , H 2 of hash functions, and only require that the reduction P B,H1,H2 outputs a collision for some h 1 ∈ H 1 and some h 2 ∈ H 2 . Here the combiner C H1,H2 (R, M ) can query different, adaptively chosen functions from H 1 and H 2 . Our impossibility also rules out the case where one considers combiners for families as just described, the reason is that we can always view a single hash function
k of the input define the hash function h ) lower bound on the output length for randomized combiners using a definition which is basically equivalent to the one in this paper, but with the restriction, that the reduction P is only allowed a single query to the breaking oracle B. We see no good reason to motivate this restriction on the reduction,
e. ρ drops below any constant for a sufficiently large security parameter which w.l.o.g. will be the output length H out of the components Hi 3 Let us mention that the main topic of their paper is security amplification, not combiners, for CRHFs.
except for the fact that the existing combiners are of this form. In particular, a reduction which needs, say any two different collisions 4 for the combiner in order to break the components, would still be perfectly convincing.
Related Work
We only consider black-box combiners, and not general combiners, where the combiner gets a full description (e.g. as a circuit) of the underlying primitives and thus is not limited to access the primitives in a black-box manner. This can be justified by noticing that most known cryptographic constructions (not only of combiners) are black-box, which means that the construction only uses the input/output behaviour of the underlying components, and moreover the security proof is black-box, which means that the reduction only uses a successful adversary against the construction in a black-box fashion in order to break the security assumption on the underlying component, such constructions are called "fully black-box" in the taxonomy of [17] . The few exceptions of non black-box constructions (notably the GMW construction of zero-knowledge proofs for NP [7] and Barak's work [1] ), are very inefficient. Thus even if non black-box combiners with short output should exist, it would be very surprising if they actually were of any practical relevance. The motivation to restrict oneself to black-box constructions is that it is often feasible to rule out such constructions, by using the fact that a black-box reduction is relativizing, i.e. it holds relative to any oracle. Thus a way to rule out the existence of a black-box construction of some primitive α from some primitive β, is to come up with a hypothetical (usually non-efficient) oracle, such that relative to this oracle β exists, but α does not. This technique was introduced by Impagliazzo and Rudich, who in their seminal paper [11] prove the impossibility of a black-box construction of key-agreement from one-way functions. Another classical result along this line due to Simon [19] proves the impossibility of constructing CRHFs from one way functions, the breaking oracle in this paper is inspired by this work.
Kim et al. [12] were the first to consider lower bound on the efficiency (as opposed to mere feasibility) of black-box constructions. They prove a lower bound on the number of calls to a one-way permutation needed to implement a pseudorandom generator (a thigh bound was subsequently proven in [6] ).
The concept of a combiners has first been explicitly considered by Herzberg [10] (who called them "tolerant constructions") and later by Harnik et al. [9] , who coined the term "robust combiner". For many natural cryptographic primitives like one-way functions, PRGs or CRHFs (1, 2)-combiners are trivially seen to exist. For other primitives like commitments and oblivious transfer the question is open [9, 10, 13, 14] .
As mentioned already in the introduction, combiners for CRHFs have been investigated by [2, 3, 16] . Fischlin and Lehmann [4] consider CRHFs combiners in an ideal setting, and in this setting are able to give a construction which is more secure than any of its components. Fischlin, Lehmann and Pietrzak recently constructed a robust (1, 2)-combiner for hash-functions with output length 2 H out , which simultanousely combines several properties, namely collisionresistance, target collision-resistance, message authentication, pseudorandomness, one-wayness and -at the price of a slightly longer output -indifferentiability from a random oracle [5] .
Combiners for CRHFs: Definition and Constructions
Notation and some Basic Definitions For X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * we denote with X Y the concatenation of X and Y . For a ∈ N we denote with [a] the set {0, 1, . . . , a − 1} and a b denotes the binary representation of a, padded with 0's to length b, e.g.
With X * ← X we denote that X is assigned a value chosen uniformly at random from the set X .
PPTM holds if A finds collisions for at least t of the H i 's.
Definition 1 (Randomized Black-Box Combiner For CRHFs). Construction: A randomized (k, )-combiner for CRHFs is a pair (C, P ) where C is an oracle circuit C : R × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n and P is an oracle PPTM. Reduction: An oracle B ρ-breaks C H1,...,H if B(R) outputs a collision for C H1,...,H (R, .) for at least a ρ-fraction of the possible choices of the randomness R ∈ R, and ⊥ on the remaining inputs.
(C, P ) is ρ-robust (where ρ can be a function of v ∈ N) if for all H 1 , . . . , H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v and any oracle B which ρ-breaks C H1,...,H the PPTM P in the random experiment P B,H1,...,H finds collisions for at least − k + 1 of the H i 's with probability at least .9, i.e. Pr H1,...,H ,P s coins
Efficiency: Let q C denote the number of oracle gates in C, and q P be an upper bound on the number of oracle queries made by P , where we do not count oracle queries to B where the answer is ⊥ (as we want to prove a negative result, not accounting for such queries makes the negative result stronger). Then the combiner (C, P ) is efficient if q C and q P are polynomial in v. Security: An efficient combiner (C, P ) is robust, if it is ρ-robust where ρ = ρ(v) is smaller than any positive constant for sufficiently large v.
Remark 2 (on the constant .9). The probability .9 in (2) is over the random coins of P . We chose to fix this probability to the arbitrary constant .9 instead of adding an additional parameter in the security definition, as the constant .9 can be replaced with any value where is noticeable 6 and bounded away from 1 by some exponentially small amount, by changing the running time of P only by a polynomial factor. The reason is that if some efficient combiner (C, P ) satisfies (2) for some (instead .9), then for any z = poly(v), we get an efficient combiner (C, Pz) which satisfies (2) with probability 1 − (1 − ) z , where Pz simply simulates P z times using fresh random coins for each run.
Concatenation Combiner. We trivially get a robust and very efficient (k, )-combiner, by concatenating the output of any − k + 1 of the components.
This combiner is an ρ-robust (k, )-combiner for any ρ > 0, where
The reduction P achieving the above parameters, simply queries the oracle B on distinct R ∈ R until it gets a collision (as ρ > 0, there will be at least one).
Random Concatenation Combiner As a generalization of the previous combiner, we can consider the combiner C :
n where we concatenate the output of c randomly chosen components. For c < − k + 1 this combiner has shorter output than (3), but also is only ρ-robust for a ρ which is bounded away from 0 by a constant, and thus is not a "robust combiner". The only reason we mention this construction here is to make clear, that the upper bound on ρ which we will need in our impossibility result is necessary.
Below each R in the randomness space [ c ] is parsed as a c element subset
In the full version of the paper we prove that this combiner is a ρ-robust (k, )-combiner for any ρ > −k c / c with parameters
Thus efficient ρ-robust (k, )-combiners with output length ( − k + 1)v exists for any ρ > 0, on the other extreme, we can get (by setting c = 1 in the above construction) ρ-robust combiners for any ρ > 1 − k/ with an output length of only v. This can be slightly improved as we'll describe now.
The Canetti et al (1, 1)-Combiner. A remarkable construction of Canetti et al [3] is a (1, 1) black-box Combiner S which, from any CRHF H with range v, constructs a CRHF S H with range v − ∆. Unfortunately, for efficient combiners, ∆ must be logarithmic, as the running time of S increases exponentially in ∆.
We will shortly sketch the idea of the Canetti et al. combiner, for the detailed construction of that combiner we refer the reader to the original paper [3] . Let H : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} v be a hash function. First one finds a string γ ∈ {0, 1} ∆ where for a random z, the prefix of H(z) is γ with good probability. 7 LetH(z) denote H(z) but with the first ∆ bits deleted, and let
the prefix of H(z) is γ}
Note that any collision z, z forH where z, z ∈ Z is also a collision for H, as
Thus we have constructed a CRHF H : Z → {0, 1} v−∆ from a CRHF H : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} v . This is almost a (1, 1)-combiner with output length v − ∆, except that the domain is some strange set Z. We must somehow map {0, 1} w where w > v injectively to a (subset) of Z in order to get a CRHF {0, 1} w → {0, 1}
v . As shown in [3] this can be achieved, albeit inefficiently in time 2 ∆ . One can replace the H i 's with S Hi in the combiners considered before in order to get shorter output, e.g. for the concatenation combiner (3) we get "Shrinked" Concatenation Combiner: The combiner (with S as above)
satisfies for any ρ > 0
The expected probability for a random γ is 2 −∆ , we're fine with anything not much smaller than that, say 2 −∆−1 , such a good γ can be found by sampling.
Main Theorem. In this paper we'll prove that the bound achieved by the combiners (4) is basically tight.
Theorem 1 (Main)
. If (C, P ), where
n is an efficient and robust randomized (k, )-combiner for CRHFs with range
This theorem is stated in asymptotic terms so it is easy to parse, but we prove a quantitative statement. The quantitative statements are given by Proposition 3 for the special case of (1, 1)-combiners, and in Proposition 4 for general (k, )-combiner. In particular, the exact meaning of "efficient" in the theorem above is given by equation (30), where q B P and q H P denote an upper bound on the number of oracle queries the reduction P makes to the breaking oracle and to the candidate hash functions respectively, so q P = q B P + q H P . Throughout the paper we assume w.l.o.g. that q B P , q H P and q C are at least one.
Lower Bounds for Restricted Combiners. A result analogous to the statement of Theorem 1 has been proven for restricted cases of combiners. Starting with [2] , who proved it for deterministic combiners (i.e. where R in Definition 1 is empty), and where the construction C was only allowed to query each H i exactly once. A simpler proof without the latter restriction (but still deterministic) was subsequently given in [16] . The proof was further simplified in [3] , who also for the first time considered the randomized case, but under the restriction that the reduction P queries the breaking oracle at most once. This special case seems much easier to prove than the general one. As the main idea behind the proof of the special case, which is a probabilistic argument, is also used in the proof of the general case, we give the full statement and proof of the special case below.
Proposition 1 (following [3] ). For some n, m, v with m > n, assume that (C, P ) where
n is a 1-robust (k, )-combiner for CRHFs with range {0, 1} v , with the additional constraint that P is querying the breaking oracle only once. Let denote the success probability (over P 's random coins) of P , i.e. for any breaking oracle B which on input R outputs a collision for C H1,...,H (R, .)
Then the output length n of C satisfies
Before we prove the proposition, let us remark that for the practically relevant case where P is efficient and is noticeable, (5) can be written as
which, up to the constant hidden in the O term, matches parameters of the combiner (4).
Proof. We will only prove the case for k = 1 and = 2 and explain at the end how to adapt the proof for the general k and . Let A be any oracle PPTM making at most q A oracle queries and H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v be uniformly random. The probability that any two (distinct) queries made by A to H give a collision for H is 1/2 v , taking the union bound over all q A (q A − 1)/2 possible pairs of queries
Now consider an oracle PPTM A which expects two oracles, making at most q A queries to each of them. Let H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v be uniformly random and independent. As the H i 's are independent, the probability that P will find collisions for both is the product of what we had in eq. (6) .
Now let (C, P ) be a combiner as in the statement of the proposition. Let A be an oracle PPTM where A H1,H2 simulates P B,H1,H2 , but answers the (single) B query R made by P with random M * ← {0, 1} m , M * ← {0, 1} m . Note that P will output collisions for H 1 , H 2 with probability conditioned on the event that M, M is a collision for C H1,H2 (R, .).
Where in the last step we used m > n which holds as C is shrinking. Now by (7) and (8) we must have · 2
which is (5) for the case where k = 1, = 2. For the general case of (k, )-combiners, we can similarly upper and lower bound the probability of a PPTM A in finding collision for at least − k + 1 of its oracles as
Solving this inequality for n then gives
Proof Outline
We will prove our main result gradually, introducing new techniques and ideas in each step. First, in Lemma 1 we show that a uniformly random function is collision resistant, using the fact that such a function cannot be compressed. Based on this technique, we then prove Proposition 3 which implies Theorem 1 for the special case k = = 1. Finally, Proposition 4 proves the general case. Due to space reasons, the proof of Proposition 4 is only given in the full version of the paper [15] .
Collisions imply Compressibility, Section 4. Gennaro and Trevisan [6] give a very elegant proof that a uniformly random permutation π :
v is one-way against poly-size, non-uniform adversaries. On a high level, they show that if P is an efficient 9 adversary which inverts π on many inputs, i.e. for many x we have A π (π(x)) = x, then π has a "short" description relative to P . This is impossible as a uniformly random π is incompressible, and thus such an P cannot exist (i.e. π is one-way).
We adapt this proof in order to show that a uniformly random function H : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} v is collision resistant. This has been independently discovered by the authors of [8] , the proof given in this paper is due to Thomas Holenstein (via personal communication with Iftach Haitner), and is much simpler than the one we had originally.
Lower Bounds for Black-Box Combiners via Incompressibility. The just sketched proof is by no means the easiest way to show that a uniformly random function is collisions resistant.
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The advantage of such a "incompressibility based" proof is that it extends to the case where P additionally gets access to a carefully defined "combiner breaking" oracle B, which itself can make much more queries to the hash function(s) than what is needed to find collisions for uniformly random functions with output length v bits (which means roughly 2 v/2 queries), as we'll explain below. This approach is inspired by a recent work of Haitner et al [8] , the Gennaro-Trevisan reconstruction lemma [6] and Simon's breaking oracle [19] . 9 Here efficient means that the number of oracle queries made by P must be much smaller than what would be required to invert π by brute force search (but can still be exponential). 10 The straight forward way to prove this, is to argue that for any two distinct queries Xa, X b made by P we have Pr[H(Xa) = H(X b )] = 2 −v , and thus by taking the union bound over all q(q − 1)/2 pairs of queries, the probability that there exist any Xa, X b where H(Xa) = H(X b ) is at most q(q − 1)/2 v+1 .
Lower bound for (1, 1)-combiners, Section 5. In order to rule out the existence of an efficient ρ-robust black-box combiner (C, P ) with output length n = v − ω(log v), one must come up with oracles H, B such that
n is not collision resistant, in the sense that B(R) outputs a collision for C H (R, .) on at least a ρ-fraction of the R ∈ {0, 1} r .
w → {0, 1} v is collision resistant (even relative to B), in the sense that the probability that P H,B finds a collision (where the probability is over the random coins of P ) is small, which means < 0.9 (cf. Remark 2).
The oracle hash function H : {0, 1}
w → {0, 1} v is chosen uniformly at random. The breaking oracle B samples, for each possible input R ∈ {0, 1} r , a random pseudocollision Z R , Z R for C H (R, .). On input R the oracle B outputs Z R , Z R if this is a "safe" collision, by which we mean that the H queries needed in order to evaluate C H (R, Z R ) and C H (R, Z R ) do not contain a collision for H. If the collision is not safe, then B(R) outputs ⊥.
Using the fact that the output length n of C H is by ω(log v) bits shorter than the output length of H, one can show (using a probabilistic argument like in the proof of Proposition 1), that with high probability most collisions Z R , Z R will be safe, and thus B will ρ-break C H for a ρ which is exponentially close to 1. This is the only part of the proof where we use the fact that C has short output.
It remains to prove that P cannot find collisions for H, even with the powerful combiner breaking oracle B. Intuitively, B should not be of much help in finding collision for H, as it only returns random collisions for C H (R, .) which are "safe" (as described above), and thus do not (at least trivially) give collisions for H. To actually prove this, we show that if P H,B finds collisions with high probability, then we can use P to compress H, which is impossible as H is uniformly random, thus such a P cannot exist.
KKLower bound for (k, )-combiners, Section 5. To rule out the existence of an efficient ρ-robust (k, )-black-box combiner (C, P ) with output length n = ( − k + 1)v − ω(log v), we will construct hash functions H 1 , . . . , H def = H and a breaking oracle B which ρ-breaks C H , but at least k of the H i 's are collision resistant even relative to B. The ρ we achieve will be exponentially close to 1/ k , which is tight because (as explained in the last section) for ρ > 1/ k combiners with output length only ( − k + 1)v exist. The H = H 1 , . . . , H : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} v are chosen uniformly at random. The breaking oracle B samples, for each
) (or, a pseudocollision to be precise, as there's a tiny 2 −m probability that Z R = Z R ). We say that Z R , Z R is a safe collision for H i , if the evaluation of C H (R, .) on inputs Z R , Z R does not contain a collision of H i . By a probabilistic argument, one can show that with high probability a random collision will be safe for at least k of the H i 's (here we need the fact that the output length of C is short). This again implies that there exists a subset Γ ⊂ {1, . . . , } of size k, such that for (almost) a 1/ k fraction of the R's, let's call it R Γ , the collision Z R , Z R is safe for all the H i with i ∈ Γ . Now B on input R outputs Z R , Z R if R ∈ R Γ , and ⊥ otherwise. Intuitively, the H i where i ∈ Γ should be still be collision resistant even relative to B. To prove this we show that if an efficient P exists where P B,H finds a collision for any H i where i ∈ Γ with high probability, then this H i can be compressed, which is impossible as H i is uniformly random, and thus such a P cannot exist. By the following proposition, any function H for which there exists an efficient collision finding algorithm P , can be compressed.
Collisions imply Compressibility
Lemma 1. Let P be an oracle PPTM which makes at most q P oracle queries. Let H be a random variable taking as value functions {0, 1} w → {0, 1} v . For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, if P finds a collision with probability δ:
Lower bound for (1, 1)-combiners. In this section we prove a Proposition which implies Theorem 1 for the special case k = = 1. The word "combiner" is a bit misleading in this case, "shrinker" would be more appropriate, as we ask for a construction which given access to a hash function H with range {0, 1} v , gives a hash function whose output length n is "significantly" shorter than v.
Proposition 3 (implies Thm.1 for the special case k = = 1). Let C : {0, 1} r × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n be an oracle circuit with input range m := v + 1 bits and with q C oracle gates, where for some t > 0 n := v − 2 log(q C ) − t (13) then, if for some oracle PPTM P (which makes q B P oracle calls to the breaking oracle and q H P oracle calls to the components) it is the case that (C, P ) is a ρ-robust (1, 1)-combiner with ρ := 1 − 2 −t+3 , then for some constant α > 0 v ≤ log q B P + log q C + 2(log(q H P + αq C q B P )) + 6 (14) or equivalently,
in particular, (C, P ) is not efficient, as by the above, either C or P must make an exponential number of queries.
From Good Collisions to Very Good Collisions. 
We omit the proof of this lemma for space reasons. The basic idea of the proof is to let Q H,B simply simulate P H,B , but whenever P is about to make a B query R, Q will additionally sample some random V 1 , . . . , V α and make all the H queries needed to compute C H (R, V i ). One can show that if the output P gets on his B query R is likely to contain a collision (which will not be a very good collision), then the H queries Q makes, will also be likely to contain a very good collision. It is the proof of this lemma where we need the fact that B(R) will output the collision Z R , Z R only if this is a safe collision.
Very Good Collisions Imply Compressibility. 
